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LABOR LAW-EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-EMPLOYER THAT
KNOWINGLY PERMITS ACTS OF DISCRIMINATION So INTOLERABLE
THAT REASONABLE EMPLOYEE SUBJECT TO THEM WOULD
RESIGN MAY BE LIABLE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
UNDER TITLE VII
Goss v. Exxon Office Systems (1984)
Over the last fifty years the United States has witnessed a significant
expansion of employee rights, primarily as a result of Congress' enact-
ment of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) I and the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.2 Courts construing the language of these statutes have de-
1. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)). The NLRA, originally enacted in
1935, was extensively modified by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and the Lan-
drum-Griffin Act of 1959. See ch. 120, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947); Pub.
L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959). Under the NLRA, employees have the right
to organize, to bargain collectively, and to "engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of... mutual aid and protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157. Moreover,
§ 8 of the NLRA protects an employee's exercise of these rights by prohibiting
threats to retaliate and other "unfair labor practices" by employers. Id. § 158.
For a further discussion of the NLRA, see R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR
LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 21-22 (1976).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (1964) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1982)). The Civil Rights Act
of 1964 is comprehensive in scope, providing protection against a wide range of
discriminatory acts. See generally id. In particular, title VII of the Act prohibits
discrimination in employment. See id. §§ 2000e-2000e-17. Under the express
terms of title VII it is unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a).
It has been suggested that the word "sex" was added to the list of race,
color, religion, and national origin in the hope of sabotaging the bill by making
it totally unpalatable to the House of Representatives. See, e.g., Sale v. Waverly-
Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784, 787 (N.D. Iowa 1975). However,
most courts have indicated that Congress' intent in including the word "sex"
was to prevent disparate treatment of female employees and to equalize the
sexes in regard to employment opportunities. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon
Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting that Civil
Rights Act "should reach any device or policy of an employer which serves to
deny acquisition and retention of a job or promotion in a job because the individ-
ual is either male or female") (emphasis in original); Diaz v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir.) ("The amendment adding the word 'sex'
(1028)
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veloped the "constructive discharge" doctrine.3 An employee is consid-
ered to have been constructively discharged when an employer makes
working conditions so intolerable that the employee resigns; no actual
dismissal by the employer is required.4 A finding of constructive dis-
charge benefits the aggrieved employee by providing a greater scope of
relief than would be available if the conditions suffered were not so in-
tolerable as to force the employee to resign.
5
•.. was adopted... to provide equal access to the job market for both men and
women."), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). Thus, title VII has frequently pro-
vided the basis for sex discrimination litigation. See, e.g., Holthaus v. Compton &
Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1975) (employee threatened with discharge
for becoming pregnant); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D.
Ariz. 1975) (female employees dismissed for objecting to sexual advances by
male supervisor); Ashworth v. Eastern Airlines, 389 F. Supp. 597 (E.D. Va.
1975) (stewardess threatened with dismissal for gaining weight); 1978 EEOC
Dec. (CCH) 6588 [No. 77-36] (women required to wear sexually provocative
outfits as job condition).
3. The constructive discharge doctrine initially developed under the NLRA.
See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. NLRB, 217 F.2d 575, 577 (2d Cir. 1954)
(inter-departmental transfer of employee to less desirable position involving a
two-thirds reduction in pay "constructively forced" employee to resign); NLRB
v. Saxe-Glassman Shoe Corp., 201 F.2d 238, 243 (1st Cir. 1953) (intimidation
and harassment by employer of union organizer, causing latter to quit,
amounted to constructive discharge). The doctrine has since been applied to a
wide range of employment discrimination cases. See infra note 6 and accompany-
ing text.
4. See Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir.
1975). The general standard as articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Young is as
follows:
The general rule is that if the employer deliberately makes an em-
ployee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced
into an involuntary resignation, then the employer has encompassed a
constructive discharge and is as liable for any illegal conduct involved
therein as if he had formally discharged the aggrieved employee.
Id. at 144 (citation omitted). See also Baxter & Farrell, Constructive Discharge-
When Quitting Means Getting Fired, 7 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 346, 347 (1981) (general
discussion of constructive discharge under Young rule).
5. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides for the payment of back
pay to victims of employment discrimination, covering a period of up to two
years between the time the discrimination began and the time it ceased or the
employee resigned. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). In constructive discharge
cases, however, the resigning employee may also recover "front pay" (for the
period after he or she resigned) in addition to preresignation damages. See Bax-
ter & Farrell, supra note 4, at 366.
Front pay derives from the provisions of title VII which authorizes the rein-
statement of an employee whose employment was terminated for discriminatory
reasons. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). An award of "front pay" is an acceptable al-
ternative to the equitable remedy of reinstatement. See, e.g., Dillon v. Coles, 746
F.2d 998, 1006-07 (3d Cir. 1984) (considering but declining to order award of
front pay in light of fact that back pay award was more than adequate); White v.
Carolina Paperboard Corp., 564 F.2d 1073, 1091 (4th Cir. 1977) (ordering pay-
ment of front pay in lieu of reinstatement in race discrimination class action
suit). In constructive discharge cases, as in discriminatory discharge cases, front
pay is calculated to cover the period running from the date of resignation up to
the date the victim of discrimination attains an opportunity to move to his or her
2
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The application of the doctrine to statutory discrimination cases has
been accepted in most federal circuit courts of appeals.6 In these cir-
cuits, discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin in violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19647 can establish
grounds for a constructive discharge claim.8 For example, the sudden
demotion of a woman from executive secretary to clerical worker be-
cause of her unwed pregnancy has been deemed a constructive
discharge.9
The circuits disagree, however, on the proper standard for deter-
mining when an employee has been constructively discharged.1 0 Some
courts apply the doctrine where an employer knowingly permits discrim-
inatory working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person sub-
ject to them would resign, and where a resignation has, in fact, taken
rightful place in the job market. Chewning v. Schlesinger, 471 F. Supp. 767, 776
(D.D.C. 1979). Thus, the potential damages recovery is significantly expanded
in constructive discharge cases since, unlike in other employment discrimination
cases, a resigning employee may recover front pay as well as preresignation back
pay.
6. See, e.g., Glass v. Petro-Tex Chem. Corp., 757 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1985)
(sex discrimination); Buckley v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 758 F.2d 1525 (11 th Cir.
1984) (age discrimination); Easter v. Jeep Corp., 750 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1984)
(sex discrimination); Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1984) (race
discrimination), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1395 (1985); Uviedo v. Steves Sash &
Door Co., 738 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1984) (national origin discrimination); Davis
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 862 (1st Cir. 1983) (race discrimination);
Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1983) (age discrimination);
Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1982) (race discrimina-
tion); Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1982) (sex discrimination); Hen-
son v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982) (sexual harassment); Clark
v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (sex discrimination); EEOC v. St.
Anne's Hosp. of Chicago, Inc., 664 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1981) (personnel officer
fired for hiring a black employee); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250
(8th Cir. 1971) (race discrimination).
7. For a discussion of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see supra note
2.
8. See, e.g., Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1984) (race dis-
crimination); Held v. Gulf Oil, 684 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1982) (sex discrimination).
For a further discussion of Satterwhite, see infra notes 55-57 and accompanying
text. For a further discussion of Held, see infra notes 52-54 and accompanying
text.
9. SeeJacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 917 (1977).
10. Some courts of appeals require a finding that the discrimination com-
plained of amounted to an intentional course of conduct calculated to force the
victim's resignation. See, e.g., Irving v. Dubuque packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 172
(10th Cir. 1982); Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 929 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975). Other courts require only that the con-
duct complained of would have the foreseeable result that a reasonable person
in the employee's situation would resign. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 907-08 (11th Cir. 1982); Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617
F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980). For further discussion of the split among the cir-
cuits concerning the appropriate standard, see infra notes 35-37 & 42-57 and
accompanying text.
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place. I Others require a showing that the employer subjected its em-
ployee to such conditions with an intent to force the employee to
resign. 12
In Goss v. Exxon Office Systems,'1 a sex discrimination case, the Third
Circuit considered application of the constructive discharge doctrine
under title VII for the first time. The court held that an employer need
not intend to force an employee's resignation for the doctrine to apply; it
is sufficient that the employer knowingly permitted acts of discrimina-
tion 14 so intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would
resign. 15
Suzanne Goss was employed as a sales representative with Exxon
Office Systems Company. 16 Goss had been assigned to a lucrative sales
territory in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, and was in charge of
several major Exxon accounts.' 7 After Goss became pregnant in the
spring of 1980, her supervisor, Robert Melchionni, expressed strong
doubts to Goss about her ability to combine motherhood with a
career. 18
Although Goss suffered a miscarriage in July, 1980, she again be-
came pregnant three months later. 19 In December of that year, after
Goss had obtained a large order from Merck, Sharp & Dohme Pharma-
ceutical Company, Melchionni again verbally harrassed her about her
plans to have a family while maintaining a career with the company.
Melchionni further indicated that he was considering removing Goss
11. For further discussion of the reasonable employee standard, or "objec-
tive test," see infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. For a collection of cases
applying the objective test, see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION LAw 611 n.41 (2d ed. 1983).
12. For a further discussion of the application of the test requiring an in-
quiry into the employer's intent, see infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
For a collection of cases requiring a showing of intent, see B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 11, at 611 n.40.
13. 747 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984).
14. Under title VII, discriminatory working conditions are those which sub-ject employees to disparate treatment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). For the Supreme Court's view of
disparate treatment, see International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.14 (1977). See also B. SCHLE1 & P. GROSSMAN, supra
note 11, at 13-22.
15. 747 F.2d at 888. For further discussion of the court's holding in Goss,
see infra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
16. 747 F.2d at 888.
17. Id. Goss' account responsibility included such major pharmaceutical
companies as Merck, Sharp & Dohme and McNeil Laboratories.
18. Id. In response to Melchionni's questioning, Goss indicated her inten-
tion to have both a career and a family. Id.
19. Id. Goss returned to work after the miscarriage without any loss in
working time. Id.
1985] 1031
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from the Merck account.20
Just before the Christmas holiday, Goss suffered a second miscar-
riage.2 1 When she returned to work in January, 1981, she was told she
was being transferred, over her objections, to a less desirable sales terri-
tory. 22 She was replaced by Richard Slaughter, who was given the posi-
tion as an inducement for his wife to transfer from Exxon's Houston
office to Philadelphia. 23 Although there were two lucrative territories
available,2 4 Melchionni had recommended that Goss' area, rather than
that of a male employee, should be offered to Slaughter. 2 5 Melchionni
supported his recommendation with the observation that Goss was
" 'wacko,' pregnant, and likely to leave." 26 On February 9, 1981, Goss
submitted her resignation to Exxon. 27 She subsequently filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
2 8
The district court found that Exxon had engaged in sex discrimina-
tion in violation of title VII,2 9 and that such discrimination was so severe
as to constitute a constructive discharge. 30 Exxon appealed the lower
court's decision to the Third Circuit, conceding that it subjected Goss to
sex discrimination, but denying that the discriminatory conditions she
suffered were so intolerable that they amounted to a constructive
20. Id. The court found that Melchionni's verbal conduct was aggressive
enough to drive Goss to tears. Id.
21. Id. After the second miscarriage, Goss spent two weeks recuperating.
Because of the year-end holidays, she missed only one week of work. Id.
22. Id. Goss complained about her sudden transfer to Melchionni's superi-
ors at Exxon, in accordance with the company's "open door" policy. Id. Despite
the series of discussions which followed, the Exxon official told Goss to either
sign an agreement accepting a new territorial assignment, or resign. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. The second available area, serviced by Tom Katona, was not offered
to Slaughter. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. Based on Melchionni's recommendation and comments, the trial
court concluded that the decision to give Goss' territory to Slaughter was based
on Goss' sex and pregnancy. Id. at 889.
27. Id. Over the next two years Goss held jobs at three other companies,
each of which paid her less than she had been making at Exxon. Id.
28. The district court case is unreported. The case was heard by Judge
Clarence Newcomer of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania. Id. at 885-86.
29. Id. at 885. The district court found that, in order to make room for
Slaughter, Exxon sacrificed Goss rather than a male employee because of her
sex and pregnancy, and that this decision was a violation of title VII. Id. at 888.
30. Id. at 885. The district court noted that for a salesperson, a positive
mental attitude is essential to proper performance. Id. at 888-89. The series of
events preceeding Goss' resignation effectively shattered Goss' confidence in
herself and in her employer, thus making it impossible for her to continue to
work effectively. Id. As a result, the district court found that Goss was entitled
to a remedy both for pretermination sexual discrimination and for wrongful ter-
mination of her employment. Id. at 889.
1032
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discharge. 3'
Judge Gibbons, writing for a unanimous court,3 2 began his analysis
by tracing the development of the constructive discharge doctrine from
its introduction under the NLRA33 through its modern application to
title VII cases.3 4 The Third Circuit then addressed the split of opinion
among the federal courts of appeals as to what findings are necessary
before the doctrine can be applied. 3 5
Under the approach adopted by the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, the
court noted, an employer's discrimination must amount to "an inten-
tional course of conduct calculated to force the victim's resignation." '3 6
However, the Third Circuit explained that other circuits apply an "ob-
jective" standard; that is, the conduct complained of must have the
"foreseeable result" of inducing a reasonable person in the employee's
position to resign. 37
After examining the split of authority, the Third Circuit held, with-
31. Id. at 887. Goss appealed the judgment in her favor, contending that
the judgment was inadequate. Exxon cross-appealed, conceding that Goss was
subjected to sex discrimination, but asserting that it did not amount to a con-
structive discharge. Id.
32. The case was argued before Judges Seitz, Gibbons, and Hunter. Id.
33. Id. at 887 (citing NLRB v. Tricor Prods., Inc., 636 F.2d 266, 271 (10th
Cir. 1980);J. P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490, 494-95 (4th Cir. 1972);
NLRB v. Century Broadcasting Corp., 419 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1969); Bausch &
Lomb Optical Co. v. NLRB, 217 F.2d 575, 577 (2d Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Saxe-
Glassman Shoe Corp., 201 F.2d 238, 243 (1st Cir. 1953)).
34. 747 F.2d at 887. For further discussion of the application of the con-
structive discharge doctrine to title VII cases, see supra notes 6 & 8 and accompa-
nying text.
35. Id. at 887-88. For further discussion of the split among circuits, see
infra notes 42-57 and accompanying text.
36. 747 F.2d at 887-88 (citing Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250,
1256 (8th Cir. 1981); Muller v. United States Steel Co., 509 F.2d 923, 929 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975)). In Johnson, black employees claimed they
were constructively discharged when they quit after having been subjected to
harsh working conditions. 646 F.2d at 1256. The Eighth Circuit held that the
employer subjecting the blacks to harsh working conditions was not liable, as the
conditions were imposed equally on all employees, and clearly the employer did
not wish to force all of its employees to resign. Id. In Muller, a Spanish-Ameri-
can temporary employee was found not to have been constructively discharged
by his employer's refusal to consider him for a permanent position. 509 F.2d at
929. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the failure to consider the employee for
elevation was a result of the company's reduced operation and economic con-
cerns, rather than a deliberate plan to force the employee to quit. Id.
37. 747 F.2d at 887-88 (citing Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427 (6th Cir.
1982); Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980);Jacobs v.
Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 917 (1977)).
The Sixth Circuit's approach in Held is representative of the courts' analysis
under the objective standard. In Held, a white female quit her job after having
been subject to disparate treatment on account of her sex. 684 F.2d at 430. The
court held that she had been constructively discharged, despite the lack of evi-
dence as to her employer's intent, since "a man is held to intend the foreseeable
consequences of his conduct." Id. at 432 (citation omitted).
6
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out discussion, that it would apply the objective standard: "The court
need merely find that the employer knowingly permitted conditions of
discrimination in employment so intolerable that a reasonable person
subject to them would resign." a38 Having determined the legal standard
governing applicability of the constructive discharge doctrine,3 9 the
court reviewed the district court's opinion and concluded that its find-
ings were "legally sufficient" to support a judgment for Goss. 40 In a
separate discussion of damages, Judge Gibbons affirmed the lower
court's judgment against Exxon for back pay as well as for front pay.4 1
The split of opinion among the circuits that the Third Circuit con-
fronted in Goss focuses on the findings necessary for the constructive
discharge doctrine to apply.4 2 Some circuits 43 have held that the con-
structive discharge doctrine applies only when the employer's actions
were specifically designed to force a resignation. In Muller v. United
38. 747 F.2d at 888. Significantly, the Third Circuit does not require a find-
ing of employer's specific intent to force an employee's resignation as a prere-
quisite for application of the constructive discharge doctrine.
39. Id. at 889. The court characterized the proper legal standard as
whether an objective, reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign
under the same conditions suffered by the employee seeking recovery. Id. at
888.
40. Id. at 888-89.
41. Id. The district court had awarded back pay, authorized under § 7 06 (g)
of title VII, for the period from January, 1981, the date of resignation, through
June, 1983, the date of Goss' reemployment. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1982). The Third Circuit explained that the back pay award included lost com-
missions and job search expenses incurred during that time. 747 F.2d at 888-89.
According to the district court's instructions, Goss' actual earnings for the pe-
riod were deducted from the total award. Id. at 889.
The Third Circuit rejected Exxon's contention that a lower average of ac-
tual earnings from prior years, rather than projected earnings for 1981, should
be used to calculate lost commissions. Id. at 889. The court reasoned that
"[t]he risk of lack of certainty with respect to projections of lost income must be
borne by the wrongdoer, not the victim." Id. (citing Story Parchment Co. v.
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931)).
The court also approved of the district court's award of front pay covering
the period ending when Goss would be assigned to a sales territory by her new
employer. For a further discussion of front pay, see supra note 5.
42. The United States Supreme Court has recently taken a step toward
resolving the split among the circuits. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 104 S. Ct.
2803 (1984). In Sure-Tan, the Court considered application of the constructive
discharge doctrine under the unfair labor practices provision of the NLRA. Id.
(citing National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982)).
The Court concluded that undocumented aliens had been constructively dis-
charged when their employer "purposefully created working conditions so intol-
erable that the employee[s] had no option but to resign." Id. at 2810. Thus the
Supreme Court seems to adopt the view that for the constructive discharge doc-
trine to apply under the NLRA, there must be a showing of an employer's intent
to create intolerable working conditions, but not of its intent to force an em-
ployee to resign.
43. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1981);
Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 825 (1975).
1034 [Vol. 30: p. 1028
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States Steel Corp. ,44 the Tenth Circuit refused to apply the doctrine where
an Hispanic employee resigned after being denied a promotion on the
basis of his race.4 5 The court held that the employee had not been con-
structively discharged since the discriminatory policy was not imple-
mented with an intent to force the employee to quit. 46
Similarly, in Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co.,47 the Eighth Circuit refused
to apply the doctrine where one of the plaintiffs, a black man, quit his
job as a cleaner at a bread company after complaining that the work was
too harsh and that the atmosphere was racially charged.4 8 The court
reasoned that the doctrine was inapplicable since all the company's em-
ployees were subject to equally harsh working conditions. 49 The court
noted that "certainly Bunny Bread did not wish to force all its employ-
ees to resign." 50 Thus, without the requisite finding of intent, a court
adopting the Muller approach would refuse to consider such treatment
as amounting to a constructive discharge.
The majority of other courts, however, would find the constructive
discharge doctrine applicable without a showing of an employer's intent
to force its employee to quit, as long as the conditions of discrimination
would have caused a reasonable person to resign.5 1 In Held v. GulfOil,52
44. 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
45. 509 F.2d at 925. The plaintiff, Muller, had been employed with U.S.
Steel for 14 years without being considered for a promotion. Since the time the
1964 Civil Rights Act was passed, no Spanish-American at the U.S. Steel plant
had been promoted to a position of "spell foreman" or temporary foreman, a
necessary step to becoming a supervisory employee. Id.
46. Id. at 929.
47. 646 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1981).
48. Id. at 1256-57. The plaintiffs' work records in Johnson showed declining
work performance and acts of repeated insubordination toward their superiors.
Id. at 1252-53.
49. Id. at 1256-57. The court found that the difficult task of hand-scrub-
bing brew tanks, which the plaintiffs complained was required of them solely
because they were black, was required of blacks and whites equally. Id.
50. Id. at 1256.
51. See, e.g., Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir. 1984) (em-
ployee not considered for promotion due to race); Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743
F.2d 199, 209 (4th Cir. 1984) (black employees at meat processing plant
harassed and improperly disciplined), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1395 (1985); Parrett
v. City of Connersville, 737 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1984) (following Bourque v.
Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980)); Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat,
702 F.2d 322, 323 (2d Cir. 1983) (58-year-old administrator replaced by woman
in her early thirties); Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1982)
(environment of sexual bias tolerated and fostered by employer); Henson v. City
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 899 (11 th Cir. 1982) (police dispatcher resigned after
allegedly harassed by supervisor); Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1172 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (army clerk not promoted due to sex); Meyer v. Brown & Root Con-
str. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 372 (5th Cir. 1981) (employee demoted after informing
employer of her pregnancy); NLRB v. Cable Vision, Inc., 660 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir.
1981) (union activist required to work hours in conflict with his second job as
part-time musician). See also Baxter & Farrell, supra note 4, at 350 (noting that
"most cases specifically have held that such intent is not necessary") (citing Fra-
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the Sixth Circuit applied the constructive discharge doctrine where a re-
tail marketer was subject to disparate treatment by her employer on the
basis of her sex. 53 The court found it sufficient that the employer "toler-
ated and fostered" an "environment of sexual bias."' 54 The absence of
any showing that the employer was motivated by an intent to force the
employee to quit did not absolve it from liability. 55
In Satterwhite v. Smith, 56 the Ninth Circuit similarly looked to the em-
ployer's awareness of intolerable working conditions, rather than to its
intent, in deciding to apply the constructive discharge doctrine. In Sat-
terwhite, a black employee quit after he was refused access to promised
training and advancement opportunities, and after whites were regularly
promoted ahead of him. 57 The court concluded that the district court
properly found these conditions discriminatory and intolerable. 58 As
such, the constructive discharge doctrine would apply.
The ruling of the Third Circuit in Goss is consistent with the second
line of cases, which require no finding of an employer's intent to force
an employee to resign. Thus, for an employer to be liable in the Third
Circuit for constructive discharge under title VII, an employee need
only show that: 1) discriminatory working conditions existed; 2) the de-
gree of discrimination was so intolerable that a reasonable person sub-
ject to the same conditions would resign; 3) the employee did, in fact,
resign; and 4) the employee's resignation was a foreseeable conse-
quence of allowing such conditions to persist. 59
It is submitted that the objective test adopted by the Third Circuit is
zer v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 491 F. Supp. 1099, 1105 (M.D. Ga. 1980),
aff'd without opinion, 636 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1981); Bourque v. Powell Mfg. Co.,
617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980); Calcote v. Texas Educ. Found., 578 F.2d 95 (5th
Cir. 1978)).
52. 684 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1982).
53. Id. at 432.
54. Id. at 432. The "atmosphere of bias" to which the court referred in-
cluded assigning the plaintiff (who was hired as a sales representative) to menial
tasks, subjecting her regularly to sex-based innuendos, and requiring her to
work longer hours than her male counterparts. Id. at 429.
55. Id. at 432. The court reasoned that an employer must be held responsi-
ble for the foreseeable consequences of its conduct, even if there was no proof
of its specific intent to cause harm. Id.
56. 744 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1984).
57. Satterwhite was hired by the Port of Tacoma, Washington, as a tempo-
rary employee on the sweeper crew, with the understanding that he would get a
permanent appointment, based on seniority, when an opening became available.
The court found that despite their agreement, the Port of Tacoma never inter-
viewed Satterwhite for a permanent position but regularly interviewed and hired
white men. Id. at 1381.
58. Id. at 1383. The court included in its evaluation of working conditions
an assessment of "aggravating factors," such as the atmosphere created by occa-
sional racial insults, that all blacks working at the Port suffered. Id. at 1382.
59. For a discussion of the Third Circuit rule as developed and applied in
Goss, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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both practical and consistent with well recognized principles of labor
law and civil rights law. The test is practical in that it obviates the need
for a difficult and somewhat nebulous inquiry into an employer's intent.
Whether an employer discriminates against its victim with the intention
of forcing the latter to resign, or instead intends for the employee to
remain and accept the discriminatory working conditions, is a fine line
that may be impossible to discern in a given situation.
Furthermore, the Third Circuit test is consistent with the long-es-
tablished rule in labor law that an employer will be held responsible for
the foreseeable consequences of its conduct, whether or not it can be
proved that those consequences were intended.60 As the United States
Supreme Court noted in Radio Officers v. Labor Board,6' a case involving
an employer's discrimination in favor of union management, "an em-
ployer's protestation that he did not intend [the results of discriminatory
behavior] must be unavailing where the natural consequence of his ac-
tion [was such a result]." 6 2
Similarly, the Third Circuit test is consistent with the principles de-
veloped in title VII cases that an employer will be liable for the conse-
quences of its discriminatory employment practices, regardless of
whether intent to discriminate can be shown. 63 In Griggs v. Duke Power,6 4
60. See Radio Officer Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 45 (1953) ("This recog-
nition that specific proof of intent is unnecessary where employer conduct inher-
ently encourages or discourages union membership is but an application of the
common-law rule that a man is held to intend the foreseeable consequences of
his conduct."); Held v. Gulf Oil, 684 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1982) (noting the
established rule in labor law that a person is deemed to intend the foreseeable
consequences of his or her conduct). See also Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168,
1175 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("To the extent that [the employer] denies a conscious
design to force [the employee] to resign, we note that an employer's subjective
intent is irrelevant; [the employer] must be held to have intended those conse-
quences it could reasonably have foreseen.") (citations omitted).
61. 347 U.S. 17 (1953).
62. Id. at 45.
63. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Erebia v. Chrysler
Plastic Prods. Corp., 772 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1985); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251
(4th Cir. 1983). Duke Power has been hailed as "the most important decision in
employment discrimination law." B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 11, at 5.
For further discussion of Duke Power, see infra notes 64-66 and accompanying
text.
In Erebia, a title VII violation was found where an employer permitted an
atmosphere of racial hostility to persist at its workplace, despite the fact that
there was no showing of the employer's intent to discriminate. The Sixth Circuit
reasoned that to require a finding that the employer intended to discriminate
"would erode severely the important protection courts have recognized under
[civil rights statutes]. An employer with a small number of minority employees
could allow them to be harassed and subjected to slurs, simply do nothing, and
avoid responsibility and liability." 772 F.2d at 1258.
In Katz, a female air traffic controller filed a sex discrimination suit based on
substantial sexual harassment by male employees at her workplace. 709 F.2d at
253-54. The court found that since the female employee's supervisors were
aware of the pervasive sexual slurs, insults, and innuendos directed at her, but
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where the administration of a standardized intelligence test as a condi-
tion of employment had the effect of discriminating on the basis of race,
a violation of title VII was found to exist regardless of whether the em-
ployer intended to discriminate against any particular ethnic group. 65
The rationale behind the Duke Power holding was that "Congress di-
rected the thrust of [title VII] to the consequences of employment prac-
tices, not simply the motivation.''66 The Third Circuit rule, holding an
employer responsible for the consequences of its employment prac-
tices-consequences which may include a forced resignation-regard-
less of whether the consequences were intended, is, therefore, in
keeping with the Supreme Court's interpretation of title VII as evi-
denced in Duke Power.
Given the Third Circuit's holding in Goss, it will be good practice for
employers to take notice of the constructive discharge doctrine, and to
investigate potentially discriminatory conditions that may exist at their
workplace. Otherwise, an employer may find itself liable for discrimina-
tory working conditions that induced one or more of its employees to
resign, even though the employer never intended that such resignations
occur.
While the expense of investigating and remedying latent areas of
discrimination at a particular workplace may discourage some employers
from taking such action, that cost should be weighed against the poten-
tially far greater expense of defending against, and paying damages as-
sociated with, a successful constructive discharge suit. That expense, as
the Goss decision pointed out, may include an award of full back pay67 as
well as an award of lost future earnings. 68 It is suggested that the least
costly choice might well be to investigate and correct potential problems
rather than to pay the costs of an unexpected constructive discharge
claim.
The Goss decision will undoubtedly have a lasting impact on em-
ployer-employee relations. Employers in the Third Circuit now have an
added incentive to seek out potential sources of discrimination, and to
failed to take corrective action, the employer was liable for violations under title
VII. Id. at 254.
64. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
65. Id. at 436. The Supreme Court in Duke Power interpreted title VII to
proscribe "not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form,
but discriminatory in operation." Id. at 431. In other words, practices that had a
discriminatory effect were to be forbidden, regardless of the employer's intent in
undertaking those acts. Id. at 432.
66. Id. at 432 (emphasis in original).
67. For a discussion of back pay awards in constructive discharge cases, see
supra notes 5 & 41.
68. Lost future earnings, also known as front pay, are calculated from the
date employment is terminated until the time the victim is expected to regain his
or her rightful place in the job market. For a further discussion of front pay, see
supra notes 5 & 41.
1038 [Vol. 30: p. 1028
11
Sullivan: Labor Law - Employment Discrimination - Employer That Knowingly P
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
1985] THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW 1039
maintain tolerable, nondiscriminatory conditions at their workplace. In-
deed, by applying an objective standard to constructive discharge cases,
the Third Circuit has moved in a direction for which all employees, es-
pecially potential victims of title VII discrimination, will be grateful.
Howard E. Sullivan, III
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